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Abstract—A key component of security in decentralized block-
chains is proof of opportunity cost among block producers. In the
case of proof-of-work (PoW), currently used by the most prominent
systems, the cost is due to spent computation. In this paper, we
characterize the security investment of miners in terms of its cost in
fiat money. This enables comparison of security allocations across
PoW blockchains that generally use different PoW algorithms and
reward miners in different cryptocurrency units. We prove that there
exists a unique allocation equilibrium, depending on market prices
only, that is achieved by both strategic miners (who contemplate
the actions of others) and by miners seeking only short-term profit.
In fact, the latter will unknowingly compensate for any attempt to
deliberately shift security allocation away from equilibrium.
Our conclusions are supported analytically through the develop-
ment of a Markov decision process, game theoretical analysis, and
derivation of no arbitrage conditions. We corroborate those results
with empirical evidence from more than two years of blockchain
and price data. Overall agreement is strong. We show that between
January 1, 2018 and August 1, 2020, market prices predicted security
allocation between Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash with error less than
0.6%. And from the beginning of October 2019, until August 1, 2020,
market prices predicted security allocation between Bitcoin and
Litecoin with error of 0.45%. These results are further corroborated
by our establishment of Granger-causality between change in market
prices and change in security allocation.
To demonstrate the practicality of our results, we describe a
trustless oracle that leverages the equilibrium to estimate the price
ratios of PoW cryptocurrencies from on-chain information only.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [1] have emerged as an
intriguing complement to state-backed fiat currencies. We
analyze the security of blockchains in the form of distributed
systems with decentralized control and weak identification of
participants (i.e., Sybil attacks [2] are possible and require
mitigation).
Typically, cryptocurrencies are implemented using a block-
chain data structure, with each block containing a set of
transactions. Although there are many aspects of blockchain
security, in this paper we focus on security as it relates to
consensus on the contents of blocks.
A blockchain is secure only to the extent that consensus
emerges from the entire set of participants rather than an
individual or subgroup. For blockchains with open membership,
consensus is based on one of several different mechanisms
including proof-of-work (PoW) [1] and proof-of-stake (PoS) [3],
which are the two most popular choices. To gain the authority to
record transaction history to the blockchain, the former forces
participants to demonstrate use of computational resources,
while the latter requires that participant funds be locked for
a fixed period of time. Because participants could invest their
resources elsewhere, participation in consensus, and thus the
basis of blockchain security, is the summed opportunity cost
of all participants. This cost is offset by a reward paid in cryp-
tocurrency, which has a market-driven fiat value. Blockchains
are secure when the opportunity cost cannot be borne by one
dishonest participant or group that seeks to control consensus.
Thus, the relative security of cryptocurrencies can be determined
from the fiat value of their opportunity costs.
The relationship between the resources that participants
choose to allocate among chains and the market-based fiat
exchange value of each cryptocurrency is fundamental to the
amount of security provided, and yet it is not well understood.
In this paper, we provide novel analysis of this relationship and
the allocation chosen by participants to one blockchain over
another. Earlier work offers an incomplete understanding of
this relationship. Spiegelman et al. [4] predicted the existence
of stable equilibria among resource allocations, and Kwon et
al. [5] subsequently identified multiple Nash equilibria, with
one being closely observed in practice. Indeed, there exists
evidence that some blockchain participants are already aware of
this equilibrium [6].
Although Kwon et al. [5] take an important first step, we feel
their analysis requires refinement. Their utility function is not
parsimonious, relying on multiple miner-types unnecessarily
so that the regime for each equilibrium cannot be determined
without unobservable information. This precluded critical tests
of the theory in their work. The following questions remain
unanswered in their work. Why does one equilibrium dominate
all others in practice? How do nonstrategic agents find this
equilibrium. And how does the equilibrium change with protocol
details such as cryptocurrency inflation rate or choice of PoW
algorithm? These questions are critical to understanding PoW
blockchain security, and to the best of our knowledge, the present
work is the only one that provides formal answers.
A secondary goal of our work is to bridge the gap between
techniques familiar to computer scientists and those more
commonly applied in the field of economics and finance. We
believe that both communities can benefit from this synthesis.






















a real-world, highly transparent, and greatly simplified testbed
for financial and economic theories. And on the other hand, the
study of economics and finance provides computer scientists
deeper insight into the behavior of agents who operate in the
presence of monetary incentives. In this paper, we demonstrate
how the latter can be used to develop a robust and highly
accurate theory of security in PoW blockchains. For example,
we show that between January 1, 2018 and August 1, 2020,
cryptocurrency prices alone were sufficient to predict resource
allocation between Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash with root mean
squared error 0.59%; during overlapping periods, this error
is three times lower than prior work. And beginning October
2019, until August 1, 2020, we show that a combination of
cryptocurrency and hash price data is sufficient to predict
resource allocation between Bitcoin and Litecoin (which do
not share a PoW algorithm) with error of 0.45%.
The implications of our findings are profound for the block-
chain ecosystem. They provide insight into the motivations and
reasoning of PoW miners, the typically reticent participants
responsible for securing blockchains. For at least the past two
years, the scope of our data, change in currency price alone has
proven to be a remarkably accurate predictor of change in miner
resource allocation. Our results suggest that this connection is
Granger-causal [8]: changes in the fiat value of a cryptocurrency
will tend to result in a rapid change to investment in its security.
In sum, we make the following contributions.
1) We use a multi-method approach that spans solution concepts
established in computer science, economics, and finance.
Specifically, we use a Markov decision process (MDP) to
analyze basic resource allocation dynamics, competitive
game theory for multi-miner interaction, and consolidate our
theory in no-arbitrage conditions [9], a powerful solution
concept in finance that is more general than MDPs and
requires fewer assumption than Nash equilibria within game
theory. This analysis yields a single equilibrium allocation
that we show to be an attractor; every other allocation will
tend to rebalance toward it.
2) We evaluate the strength of this attractor on more than two
years of historical blockchain and price data for many of the
most popular PoW blockchains including Bitcoin, Ethereum,
Bitcoin Cash, Ethereum Classic, and Litecoin. We show
that actual resource allocation among blockchains that share
the same PoW algorithm follows extremely close to the
equilibrium; those that do not share a PoW algorithm also
follow closely, but less so due to market inefficiencies.
3) Using Granger-causality, we show that, on a systematic,
hourly basis, change in the fiat value of a cryptocurrency
elicits a change in the resources a miner allocates to securing
its blockchain. We also show that the opposite link is gen-
erally rare, but has manifested during tumultuous historical
events.
4) We leverage the correlation between actual and predicted
resource allocations to describe how to develop a trustless
exchange price ratio oracle between any pair of PoW
cryptocurrencies. Its susceptibility to manipulation is limited
relative to other decentralized solutions. And, to the best of
our knowledge, it is the first to use only on-chain information
in a way that allows for quantification of manipulation cost.
We conclude with a comparison to related work.
II. SECURITY IN POW BLOCKCHAINS
A distributed and decentralized blockchain [1] (or chain for
brevity) is a data structure, formed among autonomous peers
having weak identities [2], who assemble blocks in a hash-linked
list. Each block contains a set of transactions, which can be
simple account updates or more complex state changes in smart
contracts. Transactions are confirmed once they appear in a block
on the chain.
Mining. PoW miners achieve consensus through a block mining
process. The purpose of the mining process is to compensate
for the absence of strong identities by requiring each peer par-
ticipating in the blockchain to provide evidence of computation.
In its simplest form, each miner applies a cryptographic hash
algorithm [10] to the metadata associated with the block called
the block header, randomly varying a nonce in that header. If the
resulting hash value is less than a known target, then the miner
is considered to have mined the block and it is awarded a portion
of cryptocurrency (or coin for brevity): some is newly minted to
form a base reward and the rest is derived from transaction fees.
Coins carry an exchange value in fiat currency (a state-backed
currency such as USD), which is established by exchanges
that facilitate trade. Difficulty is a quantity inversely related
to the target by a constant. It is essentially the expected number
of hashes required to mine a block, and we treat it as such
unless otherwise indicated. (Most blockchains actually define
the difficulty somewhat differently, but our definition is similar
in spirit.) The difficulty (and therefore the target) is updated
via a protocol-defined algorithm called a difficulty adjustment
algorithm (DAA) so that all miners, working independently, are
expected to mine a block in a fixed expected time (e.g. 600
seconds in Bitcoin).
Threat model. Blockchain security is multifaceted [11]; vul-
nerabilities can arise at the network [12,13], protocol [14],
consensus [1,15], or application [16] layers. But perhaps the
most fundamental attack on PoW blockchains is the 51% attack,
which arises when the computational resources of a nefarious
individual or organization exceed those of the remaining partic-
ipants. In this work, as is common in related works [5,15], we
assume that attackers cannot break primitives or exploit network
or cryptographic vulnerabilities and that they have potentially
substantial but ultimately limited resources. Because attacker
hash rate is assumed to be limited, risk of a 51% attack is lowest
on blockchains where absolute hash power is highest [17,18].
DEFINITION 1: The security metric for PoW blockchains is
hash rate.
Hash markets. PoW mining constitutes a bona fide cost to min-
ers in terms of both capital outlay and expended electricity [19].
The majority of work performed on all major PoW blockchains
uses application specific integrated circuits (ASICs). Purchasing
ASICs constitutes a significant capital expenditure and also
creates lock-in because these devices can typically only be used
to execute a single PoW algorithm. Yet some blockchains, such
as Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash, use the same PoW algorithm. In
this case, the cost to move mining resources to the other chain
is negligible. This creates an economic tension between such
blockchains whereby the incentive to mine on a given chain
vacillates depending on the relative fiat value of reward per
hash at any given moment. Moreover, there exist markets [20]
for renting time on ASICs, which allow miners to effectively
purchase reward on blockchains implementing a PoW algorithm
that they cannot mine directly themselves, or sell excess capacity
and thus amortize capital they have invested in ASICs.
III. A MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
In this section, we illustrate by example how any miner given
the choice between two blockchains will allocate his hash rate
to each in proportion to its share of the total reward to optimize
his profit. This principle is carried forward throughout the paper.
Imagine a simplified blockchain ecosystem where there exist
only two chains A and B, each implementing the same PoW
algorithm and each aiming to produce blocks at the same average
rate of T = 2 seconds. The coins issued by A carry 2 units of
fiat value while those issued by B carry only 1 unit. There exists
a single miner who must decide how to allocate his available
hash rate of H = 6 hashes per second among the two chains so
as to maximize profit. We assume that each chain’s DAA fully
adjusts to the hash rate applied to that chain after a single block.
Suppose that initially the miner’s hash rate is split evenly
among the two chains. What is the miner’s optimal hash rate
rebalancing given the initial difficulty on each chain? To answer
this question, we use a Markov decision process (MDP). States
in the MDP correspond to difficulty associated with each chain,
which we measure in terms of the expected number of hashes
required to mine a block. Actions correspond to the miner’s hash
rate allocation among the two chains. And transitions occur from
one state to another when a block is mined using the hash rate
given by the current action. Further MDP details can be found
in Appendix B. Figure 1 shows the optimal policy for the miner
in a grid where each column represents the current difficulty on
chain A and each row represents the current difficulty on chain
B. The direction of the arrow at each grid point indicates the
direction of optimal hash rate rebalancing among the two chains.
The figure reveals that the optimal action for the miner is
not simply to allocate all hash rate to chain A, which offers the
highest reward per block. This is because shifting all hash rate to
A forces the difficulty higher, raising cost. This tension captures
the essence of an equilibrium that forms between blockchains.
The main diagonal of the grid (from upper left to lower right)
in Figure 1 corresponds to states where the current aggregate
difficulty (across both chains) is equivalent to the total hash
rate that the miner can apply to the chains during the time it
takes to generate a block. Notice that the difficulties on this
diagonal always sum to 12 because blocks are generated every
2 seconds on average, and the miner can generate 6 hashes per
second. We see two major phenomena emerge. First, when the
aggregate difficulty across the two chains requires a hash rate














Fig. 1: Direction of optimal allocation of a total of 6 hashes per
second among chains A and B for given difficulties (expected
hashes per block). Each point in the plot represents difficulties
for chains A and B. The direction of arrows indicates how
to optimally rebalance allocation at the given difficulties. The
concentration point for this miner, the only state where remaining
stationary is optimal, is indicated by the red circle.
that differs from what is possessed by the miner (off-diagonal
regions), the optimal action for the miner is to move toward the
main diagonal. Second, along the main diagonal, the optimal
action is always to move toward the state indicated by the red
circle, which corresponds to a difficulty of eight hashes per block
for chain A and four hashes per block for chain B. This is the
only state for which the optimal action is to remain stationary,
making it the only concentration point in the grid.
Thus, it appears that the optimal strategy is for the miner
to allocate his hash rate on each chain in proportion to the
chain’s share of the total reward. The MDP confirms that this
property holds for other reward proportions, so it does not
appear to be a coincidence. This result implies that the fiat
value of a blockchain’s native coin has a direct and quantifiable
impact on its security relative to another blockchain. In the
remainder of this document we explain why this is the case and
both generalize and formalize the result. Going forward, we
model multiple competing miners who allocate resources among
blockchains generally having different block times and PoW
algorithms. In this broader context, we observe the formation of
an allocation equilibrium that forms at precisely the same point
achieved by the lone miner in this example.
IV. FRAMEWORK
In this section, we construct an analytical framework, which
generalizes familiar blockchain concepts and enables presenta-
tion of novel concepts in subsequent sections.
We consider two blockchains A and B, each generally using
different PoW algorithms ALGA and ALGB . Having different
PoW algorithms, we imagine that the sets of miners MA and
MB of each coin are generally disjoint, but in the special case
where ALGA = ALGB or when the algorithms are supported by
the same mining hardware, their intersection can be non-empty.
We denote the set of all miners by M = MA ∪MB .
We denote the hash rate (hashes per second) for miner m by
H(m), and with HA and HB we denote the aggregate hash rate
of all miners on chains A and B, respectively. We assume that
the hash rate for each miner remains constant over time as does
the total hash rateH . Through secondary hash rate markets such
as NiceHash [20], it is possible for a miner m ∈ MA to trade
hash power in A (through a series of trades) for hash power in
B. Thus, the sets MA and MB are fluid, i.e. miners can readily
move between sets.
We denote by TX the target average block inter-arrival time
for chain X ∈ {A,B}. In general, blocks from chains A and B
will be produced at different times, but we require some method
of marking time universally. Let τ be a discrete variable that
represents the times when a block is mined on chain A or B.
At time τ , the actual inter-arrival time for the latest block from
chain X is given by tX(τ).
DEFINITION 2: The spot hash price at time τ , denoted σX(τ),
is the fiat price of a single hash using PoW algorithm ALGX .
The spot hash price on a given blockchain is simply the
cost to purchase hash power on that chain. Using Definition 2,
and assuming a perfectly efficient hash rate market, we can
quantify the fiat value of hash power devoted to securing a given
blockchain.
DEFINITION 3: The actual security investment in blockchain
X , denoted sX(τ) = HX(τ)σX(τ), is the actual fiat value of
hash power devoted by miners to mining on chain X for one
second at time τ .
The actual security investment definition abstracts the conven-
tional concept of hash rate by converting hashes per second to
fiat per second.
DEFINITION 4: The security allocation at time τ , denoted by
vectorw(τ), is the fraction of the total actual security investment
applied to each chain:





We often refer to a security allocation as simply an allocation
for brevity, and we also drop τ from the notation when time is
either unimportant or clear from context. Notice that the security
allocation to chain X ∈ {A,B} is equivalent to the fraction
of total actual security investment allocated to chain X . Thus,
when chains A and B share the same PoW algorithm, σA = σB
and w gives the share of total hash rate allocated to each chain.
At times we consider the relative security only for miner mi,
which we denote by wi = (wiA, wiB), where∑
i,mi∈M
wi = w. (2)
The fiat value of the coinbase reward plus average fees for
chain X is given by VX(τ). Coinbase value decomposes into
VX(τ) = kX(τ)PX(τ), where kX(τ) is the quantity ofX coins
(from base reward and average transaction fees) paid out per
block, and PX(τ) is the fiat value of each coin from chain X at
time τ .




DEFINITION 5: The target security investment SX(τ) for a
blockchain X at time τ is the fiat value of hash power that must
be applied to chain X by miners, for each second beginning at
time τ , to produce a block in expected time TX .
Recall from Section II that the difficulty of a blockchain
measures the expected number of hashes required to mine a
block. The target security investment abstracts the difficulty
by converting hashes per block to fiat per second. Contrast
actual and target security investments s and S with conventional
quantities hash rate and difficulty H and D. Quantities s and H
are controlled by the miner, they reflect actual resources devoted
to mining, while quantities S and D are set by the blockchain
protocol, they reflect prescribed mining resources.
A. Inferring security
Meeting target security SX is required to produce blocks on
chain X in expected time TX . Thus, the rate of coin issuance is
tied directly to the relative difference between actual and target
security. To maintain a desired block time, blockchains attempt
to tune SX to match actual security sX as closely as possible.
However, in PoW blockchains, sX cannot be determined from
on-chain information alone. So PoW blockchain protocols must
implement methods for inferring security.
DEFINITION 6: For a given blockchain, a security adjustment
algorithm (SAA) is any algorithm that adjusts its baseline
security SX so that it tends toward sX .
The SAA is simply an abstraction of the DAA described in
Section II. To be clear, blockchains implement DAAs, but we
choose to describe them as SAAs to emphasize that they are
changing the target security investment. A conventional SAA
measures average block time t̄(τ) over a given window and
adjusts SX(τ) in the direction of SX(τ) TXt̄(τ) . When t̄(τ) = TX
we say the SAA is at rest.
Blockchains record their security in terms of difficulty D.
Therefore, empirical analysis requires that we express security
allocation in terms of the difficulty. Section II describes the
difficulty as the expected number of hashes required to mine a
block. Thus, for chain X ∈ {A,B}, and when the DAA is at
rest, we have that HX(τ) ≈ DX(τ)/TX . Finally, according to








V. NASH EQUILIBRIUM FOR SECURITY ALLOCATION
The motivating MDP in Section III models a single miner,
yet an essential aspect of blockchain security is competition
between many miners. This nuance calls for game theory as
a method to account for strategic action in anticipation of
other miner’s actions. Applying game theory to the hash rate
allocation problem allows us to generalize the optimization
problem solved by the MDP to Nash equilibria, i.e., a situation
in which no party can deviate unilaterally without losing money.
In fact, the equilibrium is more general in that it applies to
pairs of blockchains with arbitrary difficulty and differing PoW
algorithms, relative rewards, and block times.
A relatively simple game is capable of describing the
concentration point observed by the MDP. We introduce the
Security Allocation Game among two blockchains A and B
(not necessarily sharing the same PoW algorithm), which is a
one-shot game with N homogeneous miners (the homogeneity
assumption applies only in this section). Following conventions
in the game theory literature, we distinguish an arbitrary miner
mi from all the others, which are labeledm−i. The miner strategy
space comprises all mixed allocations among chains A and B.
Recall from Section IV that the security allocation across
chains A and B for miner mi is given by wi = (wiA, wiB),
and w−i is similarly defined for m−i. Thus, given miner mi
and the group of other miners m−i, the overall allocation is
fully specified by [wi,w−i]. We assume unit aggregate security
investment, which is completely allocated among the two chains,
i.e. |wi| = 1N and |w−i| =
N−1
N . Being homogeneous, miners
have the property that (N − 1)s(mi) = s(m−i), i.e. each makes
the same contribution to total security investment.
Assuming that the SAA for each chain is at rest, the total


















1− wiA − w−iA
)
, (5)
which is miner mi’s share of the reward on each chain. The
payoff for mi is equal to πTiui. Payoff has one term per chain
and reflects the fact that reward is distributed to miners (in
expectation) proportionally to the security they allocate to
each chain. We search for a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
that leverages the payoff function in Eq. 4 and the miner
homogeneity assumption. The existence of a symmetric pure
strategy equilibrium is not remarkable, but it is instructive to
show that such an equilibrium matches the main equilibrium
discovered by Kwon et al. [5].
THEOREM 1: The following allocation is a symmetric












where n = N−1 and c = TBRTBR−TAR+TA . When TA = TB
the equilibrium simplifies to c = R. (Proof in Appendix E.)
The equilibrium specified by Theorem 1 coincides with the
concentration point identified in Figure 1. This result tells us
that a relatively simple game theoretical model explains the









Fig. 2: Exploiting conventional (two-point) arbitrage in currency
exchange. An investor moves fiat currency from a bank to the
Binance exchange, where she trades the fiat for Bitcoin. She
then transfers the Bitcoin to the Coinbase exchange where she
is able to sell it for a greater amount of fiat currency than she
began with.
allocation problem, but with greater generality. However, the
game theoretical approach also carries significant limitations.
First, it relies on the homogeneity of hash power among
miners. Second, it assumes that all miners have the same utility
(optimizing Eq. 4), which is unrealistic because miners face
variable costs and they may accept losses to promote a chain of
their liking. Third, our simple game assumes that miners have no
outside options, which exist in the real world by abstaining,
mining on a third chain, or selling excess mining capacity.
Fourth, the game does not consider higher moments of the payoff
distribution (beyond expected value): miner risk appetite might
result in different adjustments to obtain their individual objective
function. Fifth, the approach is not exhaustive. It is difficult to
completely eliminate the possibility of other equilibria that might
arise asymmetrically or in mixed strategies.
Kwon et al. [5] also developed a game theoretical model,
which identifies the same symmetric Nash equilibrium and
a number of others. However, that model suffers from the
same limitations listed above and others as well. First, that
model defines several game players: loyal, automatic, stick and
fickle miners. Such a composition of players is problematic:
some are implausible (for example, fickle miners switch chains
only when the difficulty adjusts) and their relative quantities
are unobservable. Second, that model describes equilibrium
strategies for fickle miners by making assumptions about the
resources and behavior of the loyal and stick miners. As a
result, the utility function for fickle miners incorporates the
characteristics of loyal and stick miners, which cannot be known
a priori. This assumption makes it even less plausible that
miners would all follow the same utility function. Note that
our model assumes that best-response miners can switch chains
instantaneously. We feel that this is the most plausible game
player; and we show in Section VII that it is sufficient to explain
much of miner behavior in practice.
In the next section, we introduce an approach that captures
the uniqueness of the equilibrium described in Theorem 1. We
use the technique to show that this equilibrium is unique under
much weaker assumptions, eliminating the list of limitations
above.
VI. ARBITRAGE CONDITIONS AT EQUILIBRIUM
The game theoretical equilibrium of Section V is important
because it explains the behavior of a group of strategic miners
who understand how mining profitability changes in a competi-
tive environment. In the case where all miners achieve this level
of sophistication, and subject to the assumptions of the section,
the equilibrium of Theorem 1 will be achieved. However, it is
unlikely that all miners currently are strategic and implausible
that all assumptions are met. Given these limitations, we seek to
understand how security allocation is affected when most of the
assumptions in Section V are relaxed.
The finance literature has studied no arbitrage (NA) condi-
tions, weak conditions that guarantee profitability. Informally,
arbitrage occurs when profit is made at zero cost. NA theory
posits that agents will change their behavior to exploit arbitrage
opportunities when they exist, and will maintain their behavior
(forming an equilibrium) when they do not. Figure 2 depicts
conventional two-point arbitrage in the context of currency
exchange. In this example, an investor sees an opportunity to
capitalize on the difference in trade price of Bitcoin on two
different exchanges. The existence of arbitrage creates strong
incentive for investors to exploit the opportunity until they reach
a point of no arbitrage.
We prove Theorems 2 and 3 and Corollary 1, which together
imply that: (i) there exists a single security allocation weq that
achieves no arbitrage; (ii) at every other allocation, it is possible
to exploit arbitrage by rebalancing in the direction of weq; and
(iii) as long as miners maintain constant security (i.e., hash
rate) across chains, every rebalancing that exploits arbitrage will
move the allocation in the direction of weq. Based on these
results, our key finding is that a miner allocating hash rate off
equilibrium (be it accidental or intentional) will not tend to move
the equilibrium because his bias toward one chain will be offset
by another miner exploiting the resulting arbitrage opportunity.
Therefore, to boost the proportion of hash rate on a given chain,
one must move the market price of the chain’s coin, not donate
hash power.
A. Derivative Markets
In the study of finance, we are often concerned with the payoff
of a certain portfolio of financial securities at a future date. In
the simplest model, agent mi purchases contingent claims on
securities A and B in quantities ci(τ1) = (ciA(τ1), ciB(τ1))
at time τ1 using an initial endowment ei(τ1). The endowment
constitutes the resources available to the agent for purchasing
contingent claims. A contingent claim is any sort of derivative
contract on the security whose payout depends on a future
outcome, such as an option or futures contract. Contingent claims
carry purchase prices p(τ1) = (pA(τ1), pB(τ1)) at τ1. Naturally,
the portfolio price, (ci(τ1))Tp(τ1), must not exceed endowment
ei(τ1), which is the agent’s budget constraint. Contingent claims
can be sold at time τ2 for payoff Π(τ2), where Π(τ2) is a
matrix with columns corresponding to portfolio components,
rows corresponding to individual states, and where each matrix




1) Notation: In the remainder of this section, we occasionally
drop the time argument τ where it can be understood from
context, but we reintroduce it in places where time should be
emphasized. Also, for ease of exposition, we use Hadamard
notation for component-wise multiplication and division of
vectors u and v:
u v = (uAvA, uBvB) and u v = (uA/vA, uB/vB).
B. Blockchain Security Market
We define the Blockchain Security Market for agent mi, a
miner, as follows. Endowment ei(τ1) is equal to s(mi), or the
fraction of all fiat currency devoted to security across chains A
and B at time τ1 that belongs to mi. Accordingly, ei(τ1) is also
a scalar multiple of H(mi), the number of hashes that mi is
capable of producing per second. We assume that ei(τ1) remains
fixed over time so that the miner consistently operates with the
same hash rate.
Each portfolio, ci(τ1), represents a contingent claim on future
coinbase from chains A and B, respectively, between times τ1
and τ2, where we assume that τ2 − τ1 = 1 second. Price vector
p(τ1) = (SA(τ1), SB(τ1)) is equal to the cost of purchasing 1
second worth of expected reward for mining on chains A and
B. Claim vector ci(τ1) for miner i is expressed as a fraction of
p(τ1), but such that the fraction can exceed 1; i.e., it is possible
to purchase more than a single claim each second (which would
tend to generate blocks faster than the blockchain’s target rate).










which is the total expected fiat value for each chain’s block
reward during the 1 second time period and is equal to Eq. 4
when SAAs for chains A and B are at rest.
In this definition, there exists no contingency because there
is only one possible state at time τ2. As such, it is possible to
guarantee payoff ci(τ1)Tπ(τ2) at τ2. Finally, we redefine the






This allocation corresponds to the fraction of the miner’s total
security investment devoted to each chain. Throughout, we
assume that |wi| = 1, in other words, the miner allocates his
resources entirely among the two chains.
1) Portfolio Rebalancing: We imagine that each miner holds
initial claim ci(τ) but wishes to rebalance to a new claim ci(τ ′)
at some future time τ ′ with the hope of achieving a higher payoff.
Prices at time τ ′, p(τ ′) = (SA(τ ′), SB(τ ′)), correspond to the
target security investment (fiat value per second) required to
mine a block on each chain in the desired expected time. For
the miner to rebalance his claims, he must sell short his claim
on one chain to increase his claim on another. Thus, to enforce
the notion of scarcity in security investment (and ultimately
hash rate), we stipulate that ciX(τ ′)pX(τ ′) ≥ ciX(τ)pX(τ),
X ∈ {A,B}. This stipulation implies that, on any given chain,
the miner cannot sell short a claim at price p(τ ′) with total fiat













Fig. 3: Exploiting arbitrage between chains sharing the same
PoW algorithm in the Blockchain Security Market. Hashes, having
opportunity cost ($$), are generated at a constant rate by the
miner. They can be traded off between the Bitcoin Cash and
Bitcoin blockchains. In this example, shifting hashes to the Bitcoin
blockchain will mine Bitcoin having value ($) in excess of the
opportunity cost. This results in a Bitcoin payoff of value ($).
2) Properties of security allocations: We are primarily inter-
ested in the overall effect of miner behavior on the equilibrium
of Theorem 1. Therefore, going forward, we consider only
aggregate allocations.
DEFINITION 7: The aggregate claim c and endowment e





tively. Aggregate security allocation is w = c p/e.
Note that Definition 7 provides a reinterpretation of security
allocation w from Definition 4 in terms of portfolio price and
claims. The following definitions are useful to us for reasoning
about changes in allocation.
DEFINITION 8: The distance between two allocations w1
andw2 is given by the L1-norm of their difference: |w1−w2|.
DEFINITION 9: An allocation rebalancing is an allocation
∆w intended to update existing allocationw tow′ = w+∆w.
We say that a rebalancing is symmetric when ∆w = (ε,−ε) for
some ε ∈ R.
We are primarily interested in symmetric allocation rebalanc-
ings because they maintain constant aggregate resources across
both chains.
3) Portfolio pricing: Typically, security prices emerge when
buyers and sellers come to an agreement on an exchange price
but the blockchain security market is unique in that prices are
set algorithmically by the SAA. At time τ on blockchain X ,
the SAA responds to a difference between the baseline security
SX(τ) and the inferred actual security sX(τ) by moving the
value of the former closer to the value of the latter. And because
pX(τ) = SX(τ), the action of the SAA has the effect of
changing the portfolio price. The following proposition shows












Fig. 4: Exploiting arbitrage between chains having different
PoW algorithms in the Blockchain Security Market. Proceeding
clockwise from the upper left, SHA256 hash rate having fiat value
($) is used to mine Bitcoin for zero marginal profit. The Bitcoin is
then transferred back to NiceHash and used to purchase Dagger-
Hashimoto hash rate at cost ($). This hash rate is applied to
the Ethereum blockchain, which yields ether having fiat value
($$), and which is ($) greater than the fiat value of the original
SHA256 hash rate.
PROPOSITION 1: For any fixed allocationw, after the SAAs
on chains A and B come to rest, the portfolio pricing vector will
be p = ew. (Proof in Appendix E.)
4) Arbitrage: An arbitrage opportunity is formally defined
as the circumstance where πT∆w ≥ 0 and ∆wTp ≤ 0, with at
least one strict inequality [9]. Less formally, arbitrage is possible
any time it is possible to guarantee future payoff at zero cost. We
expect that a miner will seek to rebalance his claim to exploit
the higher payoff in this circumstance. Figure 3 shows how a
miner can rebalance his claim (i.e., his hash rate) between two
blockchains sharing the same PoW algorithm to increase his
profit. In this case, the opportunity cost of mining is considered
a sunk cost, and arbitrage is captured by shifting hash rate to
Bitcoin, which is the more profitable chain. In contrast, Figure 4
illustrates how arbitrage can be exploited among blockchains
that generally employ different PoW algorithms by an agent
owning no hash rate. The agent trades fiat for hash rate in a
market such as NiceHash [20], and then distributes those hashes
among blockchains. In this example, the fiat reward per unit of
cost to secure Ethereum is greater than in Bitcoin. Therefore, it is
possible to trade hash rate on Bitcoin for hash rate on Ethereum
to boost profits.
We next prove that the equilibrium allocation defined in
Theorem 1 is a point of no arbitrage. It is a point where
there exists no financial incentive for miners to rebalance their
portfolio of security allocations.
THEOREM 2: Assume any choice of SAA for chains A
andB (not necessarily the same). When the relative reward












weq = (R, 1−R), (8)
if TA = TB . (Proof in Appendix E.)
Notice that the sole requirement for maintaining the equilib-
rium described by Theorem 2 is for each miner to actively update
his allocation so as to maximize profit. Consequently, the no
arbitrage equilibrium is more plausible in practice than a Nash
equilibrium because it can be achieved without a complex utility
function and without directly contemplating the actions of other
miners.
5) Uniqueness: Now we establish the uniqueness of the
equilibrium defined by Eq. 7 among all potential points of no
arbitrage, which further motivates its formation in practice. To
that end, we begin by proving a lemma that shows portfolio cost
remains unchanged by any symmetric rebalancing.
LEMMA 1: For initial allocation w and price p, the
claims associated with a symmetric rebalancing ∆w are
given by ∆c = ∆w  w and it is always the case that
∆cTp = 0. (Proof in Appendix E.)
In the following theorem, we establish that there exists
opportunity for arbitrage at any allocation that is distinct from
the equilibrium defined in Eq. 7. Moreover, we show that the
arbitrage can be exploited with a symmetric rebalancing that
moves the allocation closer to the equilibrium.
THEOREM 3: For any allocationw 6= weq, there exists
a symmetric allocation rebalancing ∆w, such that |(w +
∆w) − weq| ≤ |w − weq|, which has price zero and
strictly positive payoff. (Proof in Appendix E.)
We close this section by arguing that, for allocations not at the
equilibrium defined by Eq. 7, every symmetric rebalancing that
moves the allocation away from the equilibrium can only reduce
the miner’s payoff. This result is significant because, along with
Theorem 3, it establishes that the equilibrium of Theorem 2 is
an attractor, meaning that off-equilibrium allocations will tend
to rebalanced toward it.
COROLLARY 1: For allocation w 6= weq, any
symmetric rebalancing allocation ∆w such that |(w +
∆w) − weq| > |w − weq| has price zero will result in
strictly negative payoff. (Proof in Appendix E.)
The results of this section prove that the only allocation with
no arbitrage is at weq and that exploiting arbitrage at any other
allocation will move it closer to weq. This result has important
implications for blockchain security and governance. A major
conclusion of Kwon et al. [5] is that, subject to the assumptions
of their Nash equilibrium, miners loyal to one chain (which they
call stick) will mine alone if their allocation exceeds weq. We
deepen this result by showing it holds under the much weaker
assumptions of NA theory. As long as most miners act to exploit
arbitrage, allocation will always return to equilibrium. And
our results further show that loyal miners confer no marginal
improvement in security to a chain for any hash rate that they
contribute below weq — if their hash rate was absent, then it
would be replaced by ordinary miners exploiting arbitrage.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we demonstrate empirically the formation
of the security allocation equilibrium described variously in
Sections III, V, and VI. Our theory is overwhelmingly supported
by data at hourly granularity, with much lower error results than
previous work [5] that used less granular data. Moreover, we
illuminate security allocation relationships between blockchains
previously believed to be unrelated.
Recall that the actual security allocation between two block-
chainsA andB is given byw (see Definition 4). In plain terms, a
certain amount of hash rate is applied to both chains cumulatively
and this hash rate has a fiat value (as determined by its trade
price σ in a marketplace like NiceHash [20]). Vectorw captures
the relative fiat value devoted to security on each chain. Below,
we show that the equilibrium pointwe, described by Theorem 2,
closely matches the actual allocation w for historical data.
A. Data collection and preprocessing
We collected historical data for several of the largest PoW
blockchains by market capitalization including Bitcoin (BTC),
Bitcoin Cash (BCH), Ethereum (ETH), Ethereum Classic (ETC),
and Litecoin (LTC). Included in the datasets were hourly fiat
/ coin exchange prices from the Bitfinex exchange [21] for
dates prior to November 15, 2018 and from the Coinbase
exchange [22] for dates after. Data from the Bitstamp [23]
exchange were used for BCH only for the seven days following a
contentious hard fork on November 15, 2018. We used publicly
available Blockchain data in the Google BigQuery database [24].
We adjusted Blockchain constants such as target block time
and block reward over time to match historical values. We
gathered hash price data from NiceHash [20] for dates on or after
October 10, 2019. We downloaded the hash price order book
from NiceHash every 10 minutes, and used the mean price from
those orders as the spot price. Our results are not significantly
different when either median or best prices are used instead.
1) Estimating security allocation w: We calculated the
security allocationw between pairs of blockchains using Eq. 3.
This required calculating ŝ, the estimated security investment
for a given blockchain, whose major components are hash
rate H and hash price σ. From the blockchain data, we were
able to extract the nominal hash rate H ′(τ) at time τ from
its difficulty D(τ). For ETH and ETC, nominal hash rate is
simply H ′(τ) = D(τ)/T , where T is the target block time.
For BTC, BCH, and LTC it is also necessary to multiply
by pool difficulty (https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Difficulty), so that
H ′(τ) = 232D(τ)/T . H ′ was a sufficiently smooth estimator
for all blockchains except BTC and LTC, which update their
difficulty only once every 2016 blocks. For these two chains,
we estimated the hash rate at time τ , Ĥ(τ), by adjusting a
rolling nominal hash rate with a rolling correction term based

























































Fig. 5: Actual hash rate allocation (blue) between two cryptocur-
rencies having the same PoW algorithm juxtaposed with the
equilibrium allocation (red). The plots show strong agreement
between the actual allocation and the allocation predicted by
the equilibrium, the latter of which is based entirely on expected
block times and coinbase values. Spikes in ETH / ETC are due




























































Fig. 6: Actual hash rate allocation (blue) between two pairs of
cryptocurrencies using different PoW algorithms juxtaposed
with the equilibrium allocation (red). Agreement with the equilib-
rium is strong, albeit with significant bias during January and after
May, 2020. Spikes in actual allocation are an artifact of sudden
changes in hash price in the NiceHash marketplace. The BTC /
LTC plot is trimmed and excludes larger spikes, the lowest spike
dips to nearly 0.92.
where t(τ) is the actual block time for the given chain and ewma
denotes the exponentially weighted moving average until time
τ with 96-hour half-life. The choice of a 96-hour half-life is
justified by Figure 10 (see Appendix A), which shows that it
is capable of correcting a systematic bias in nominal hash rate.





2) Estimating equilibrium between chains weq: We calcu-
lated the equilibrium allocation between two blockchains weq
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Fig. 7: Evolution of the BTC / BCH prediction error over time.
Monthly distributions of hourly differences between equilibrium
and actual hash rate allocation (in allocation units). Positive
values mean that, from market prices, our theory predicts a
higher allocation of hash power to BTC than the actual value.
which is a function of the fiat value of rewards, V (τ), paid out
each block on either chain. At time τ , fiat reward itself was
calculated as the product of coinbase reward plus fees in the
native currency, k(τ), and the fiat exchange rate, P (τ). For
P (τ) we used the average of the high and low prices for each
hour. Reward k(τ) varied only with transaction fees, which were
highly variable for all blockchains. We smoothed fee values for
each chain using an exponentially weighted moving average
with a half-life of 96 hours. Smoothing fees is justified by the
fact that miners cannot always redirect their mining resources in
time to capitalize on an unusually high transaction fee, so they
are more likely to assume average rather than instantaneous fees.
Generally, multiple blocks arrived per hour, so to align coinbase
reward with coin price (measured hourly), we used the average
reward per hour.
B. Historical Convergence to Equilibrium
Figure 5 plots the actual security allocationw in blue for pairs
of blockchains BTC / BCH (utilizing the SHA256 algorithm)
and ETH / ETC (utilizing the DaggerHashimoto algorithm), with
one pair per facet, along with the equilibrium allocation weq,
which is plotted in red. Table I also shows several error metrics
for each pair, broken down by year. Overall agreement between
the red and blue curves was excellent in both facets, which
indicates convergence to the equilibrium defined by Theorem 2.
The most notable deviation from equilibrium in the BTC / BCH
plot occurs during a contentious hard fork on the BCH chain
(which created Bitcoin Satoshi Vision or BSV; see https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin Cash). The fork was responsible for
draining hash rate from the BCH chain and also resulted in
roughly a week-long halt to nearly all fiat exchange of the BCH
coin. Both these factors likely contributed to the disruption in
the equilibrium. Figure 7 shows the trend in prediction error for
the BTC / BCH pair over time. Agreement between actual and
equilibrium allocations has tightened considerably since 2019
with bias becoming particularly low.
RMSE MAE ME PSNR
2018 BTC/BCH 0.0091 0.0058 −0.0012 40.8669
ETH/ETC 0.0059 0.0042 −0.0042 44.5371
2019 BTC/BCH 0.0021 0.0016 0.0005 53.5354
ETH/ETC 0.0040 0.0019 0.0009 48.0315
BTC/ETH∗ 0.0096 0.0071 0.0051 40.3168
BTC/LTC∗ 0.0030 0.0020 −0.0014 50.3599
2020 BTC/BCH 0.0026 0.0019 −0.0003 51.5503
(thru ETH/ETC 0.0034 0.0025 −0.0012 49.4645
July) BTC/ETH 0.0292 0.0198 0.0148 30.6927
BTC/LTC 0.0049 0.0036 −0.0004 46.1951
Kwon BTC/BCH (ours) 0.0089 0.0055 −0.0009 41.0030
Range BTC/BCH [5] 0.0268 0.0196 −0.0155 31.4217
TABLE I: Fit between equilibrium and actual allocation. Root
mean square error, mean average error, mean error (all in
allocation units; lower is better) and peak signal-to-noise ratio (in
dB; higher is better) for hourly data. Partial data for the given time
period is indicated with an asterisk. The Kwon Range compares
our results to those of Kwon et al. [5] for an overlapping period
ranging through most of 2018.
Agreement between w and weq in the ETH / ETC plot is
not quite as strong as in BTC / BCH. There are two major
deviations between actual and equilibrium allocations. First,
there are several prominent spikes evident in the equilibrium.
These all originate from excessively large transaction fees in
ETC, which we believe appeared too suddenly for miners to
respond by reallocating hash power. The most prominent occurs
around the time of a known attack on ETC [25]. After removing
the top 0.1% largest fees, the spikes disappear. Second there is
a subtle bias toward ETH in the equilibrium for the dates prior
to May 29, 2018, the date of a hard fork on the ETC chain,
after which the bias abruptly vanishes. The hard fork removed a
difficulty bomb, a piece of code that intentionally increases the
difficulty (and therefore block time), so as to encourage a hard
fork. However, the difficulty bomb does not affect the calculation
of nominal hash rate (several bombs active for ETH during this
time period have no effect), and the bomb was not active before
mid February 2018 even though the bias existed earlier than
that. So we cannot identify a definitive reason for this early bias.
Figure 9 in Appendix A shows the trend in overall error between
actual and equilibrium allocation for the ETH / ETC pair.
Kwon et al. [5] also considered convergence of security
allocation (hash rate) to the equilibrium among blockchains
utilizing the same PoW algorithm. However, their analysis was
considerably more limited. Their dataset focussed exclusively
on the SHA256 PoW algorithm and was limited to dates prior
to 2019. Furthermore, it failed to account for some protocol
nuances such as transaction fees and bias in BTC’s nominal hash
rate. As a result, their findings conveyed much looser adherence
to the equilibrium. Table I (gray) shows the error for BTC / BCH
from January 1 to December 15, 2018 comparing the results
of Kwon et al. with ours (the only dates our data overlapped
with theirs). Note that we dropped dates from our data ranging
from June 6 through August 12 because it was missing from
their dataset. For root mean squared error, their results incur
three times the error of ours. Moreover, mean error for their data
reveals strong bias (most likely due to missing transaction fees).
1) Multiple PoW Algorithms: Miner adherence to the equi-
librium is remarkably reliable between blockchains that share
the same PoW algorithm. More remarkable still is that the
equilibrium continues to hold between blockchains that do not
share PoW algorithms.
Similar to Figure 5, Figure 6 plots actual security allocation
w, in blue, and equilibrium allocation weq, in red, this time
for pairs of blockchains BTC / ETH and BTC / LTC. Because
these plots pair blockchains that do not share a PoW algorithm,
arbitrage must be achieved by trading hash rate through a
secondary market such as NiceHash. The plots show generally
good agreement, in terms of both magnitude and correlation
between curves, but the equilibrium allocation in both plots does
reveal significant bias during the month of January and again
after May, 2020. Table I shows that the equilibrium for BTC /
LTC deviates from the actual allocation with overall error of the
same order as was observed for single PoW pairs. In contrast,
deviation between the equilibrium and actual allocation of BTC
/ ETH shows error roughly 10 times greater than that of single
PoW pairs. Bias is similarly elevated. Nevertheless, both root
mean square error and mean square error remain below 3%.
Overall, the results suggest that the Blockchain Security
Market seeks the point of no arbitrage even if it can only be
accessed through secondary hash rate markets. We hypothesize
that it is inefficiency in the the hash rate market itself that
introduces the higher error in the agreement between equilibrium
and actual allocations.
VIII. CAUSAL ANALYSIS
Section VII depicts a very strong historical correlation
between security allocation and the allocation equilibrium
predicted by Theorem 2. The demonstration is empirical, but
graphical nonetheless. In this section, we dig deeper into the
relationship between actual and equilibrium allocations among
chains sharing a PoW algorithm. Specifically, we ask, to what
extent does change in actual allocation invoke change in the
equilibrium, and vice versa? Actual security allocation w is a
function of the hash rate that miners devote to each chain, while
the equilibrium allocation weq is a function of the fiat exchange
price of the coins native to those blockchains. Thus, the question
asks how hash rate and coin price mutually influence each other.
By evaluating Granger causality [8] between these quantities,
we find strong evidence that coin price influences hash rate
allocation, which implies that miner security allocation follows
the equilibrium. However, the opposite is not typically true: hash
rate allocation rarely exhibits a causal effect on coin price. This
is not to say that increased hash rate cannot move coin price, only
that we find scant evidence for it on a systematic, hourly basis.
One possible reason for a lack of observed (Granger) causal
effect may be because small changes in hash rate away from the
equilibrium will be quickly offset by other miners exploiting the
arbitrage opportunity it creates.
These findings have profound implications for blockchain
security and governance. First, they imply that blockchains
with fixed coin issuance and low coin value are destined to
suffer from commensurately low security so long as their coin’s
price is suppressed. Second, dramatic changes in coin price,
which are commonly observed in the cryptocurrency realm, can
cause equally sudden changes in security. Third, we find little
evidence that security improvements (reductions) are rewarded
(punished) by the market. This does not rule out the possibility
that it happens occasionally, but the signal is typically very weak.
Indeed, individual market participants (i.e., miners) may attempt
to improve security by increasing security allocation to a given
chain. But their efforts tend to be too marginal or their effort is
offset by reverse actions of other market participants who exploit
arbitrage and bring security back toward equilibrium.
Granger causality is a method used to establish causality
between two time series with the simple rationale that a later
event cannot give rise to an earlier one. This notion of causality
is weaker than the “gold standard” obtained from controlled
experiments, which are very difficult to conduct in real markets.
Granger causality assumes that there exists no unobserved third
variable influencing events in both series with different latency.
With this caveat in mind, we proceed by estimating pairs of
regression equations, each with a time-lagged version of the
other as a predictor.
Regression on a time series amounts to extracting a stochastic
process from temporal data. As a byproduct of the temporal
nature of the data, standard regression techniques can often
lead to dependent residuals, which imply the process is non-
stationary, compromising the validity of statistical inference [26].
The problem manifests with the existence of unit (i.e., trivial)
roots in the characteristic regression equation. The standard
solution is to differentiate the dependent variables in the
equation several times until the unit-root vanishes. Table II
(see Appendix A) shows that this happens after calculating first
differences for all our series of interest. This implies that, while
raw security allocations and equilibrium points are not stationary,
hourly changes in these variables are. Therefore the analyses in
this section refer to first differences of series calculated from
empirical data. This transformation does not affect the logic
behind Granger causality.
To determine if change in coin exchange price (labeled price
change), as the main component of the equilibrium, Granger-
causes actual security allocation rebalancing (labeled security
rebalancing), we fit the following two specifications,
∆wt + εt = a+ b1 ·∆wt−1 (11)
∆wt + εt = a+ b1 ·∆wt−1 + b2 ·∆weqt−1, (12)
and test if the additional term related to coefficient b2 in Specifi-
cation 12 improves explanatory power over Specification 11.
Likewise, we check if security rebalancing Granger-causes
change in equilibrium allocation (a proxy for price change) by
fitting
∆weqt + εt = a+ b1 ·∆weqt−1 (13)
∆weqt + εt = a+ b1 ·∆weqt−1 + b2 ·∆wt−1, (14)
and performing the same test. All models are fit by minimizing
the squares of the residuals εt.
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Fig. 8: Monthly results for the Granger causality analysis. The
strength of the evidence for a causal link is color-coded by the
statistical significance of the F -test as follows: • absent (p > 0.1),
• marginal (p ≤ 0.1), • weak (p ≤ 0.05), • moderate (p ≤ 0.01),
and • strong (p ≤ 0.001). Input data: hourly first differences.
Figure 8 shows the strength of Granger-causal link for
blockchain pairs BTC / BCH (top facet) and ETH / ETC (bottom
facet) from price change to security rebalancing (top row) and
security rebalancing to price change (bottom row). In particular,
the figure reports the probability of a type I error in choosing
Specification 12 (top row) over 11 and choosing Specification 14
over 13 (bottom row). Dark green dots indicate very low p-value,
or a strong Granger-causal link, while black dots indicate a very
high p-value, or no Granger-causal link.
On a systematic, hourly basis, we find overwhelming evidence
that security rebalancing follows price change. But only in
rare circumstances will the market look to hash rate (security
rebalancing) to readjust price. This lends strong support to
the conclusion that change in coin price (and thus expected
reward) Granger-causes security rebalancing, but typically not
the opposite. One reason for the rarity of a Granger-causal link
in the opposite direction might be that a change in security
allocation away from the equilibrium is quickly offset by
other miners shifting their hash rate in the opposite direction.
Nevertheless, the conditions under which security rebalancing
does influence price change are noteworthy. We can see from
Figure 8 (top) that the only month that saw a strong link for the
BTC / BCH pair was during the last subsidy halving for BTC,
when the profitability of BTC coins was suddenly cut in half.
For the ETH / ETC pair, security rebalancing was moderately
predictive of price change only during a month when ETC
experienced a series of 51% attacks [25].
We leave deeper Granger-causal analysis for future work
including more variables (if observable) and a broader class
of specifications.
IX. TRUSTLESS PRICE-RATIO ORACLE
Price oracles are a fundamental tool for many popular smart
contract applications [27–29], particularly in the nascent space
of decentralized finance (DeFi) [30–32]. Oracles typically pull
data from trusted, centralized sources [22,33,34], decentralized
exchanges [35,36], or from crowds [37,38]. Centralized sources
require trust in a corruptible third-party, while crowd sourcing
and decentralized exchanges are subject to manipulation. For
example lending platform bZx recently lost the equivalent of
nearly $1M USD due to exchange price manipulation [39].
In this section, we describe a smart contract Oracle that
leverages the allocation equilibrium described by Theorem 2 to
provide an estimate of the fiat price ratio of the cryptocurrencies
A and B from information contained in block headers only. It
can either be used alone or aggregated with existing solutions to
increase robustness. An example of a futures contract leveraging
Oracle appears in Appendix C.
In estimating the price ratio of two coins sharing the same
PoW algorithm, Oracle can be no more easily manipulated
than the PoW that secures each of the chains. For coins that
use different PoW algorithms, Section IX-B describes a contract
called Spot, which is necessary for determining the ratio of
spot hash prices. Although Spot is susceptible to manipulation,
we explain below that its extent is quantifiable and limited.
Smart contract Oracle runs on chain A, returning an
estimate of the price ratio PB/PA when the two chains are
each at a given block height. It does so by implementing a
light client for blockchain B. Two public methods are exposed:
Update(hB) and Query(bA, bB , σ∆) (see Algorithms 1 and 2
in Appendix D). Method Update(hB) allows any user to
update the chain of headers with a new header hB having the
following properties: (i) the previous block hash of hB points
to the block hash of the previous header; and (ii) the PoW
associated with the hash of hB meets the difficulty implied by
earlier headers and chainB’s protocol. If either of the conditions
are not met, then Update returns an error.
Method Query(bA, bB , σ∆) returns an estimate of the price
ratio PB/PA at the time when chain A was at block height bA,
chain B was at height bB , and the ratio of spot hash prices is
equal to σ∆, i.e., σ∆ = σBσA . If either (i) the header at block
height bB is unknown to Oracle or (ii) the block on chain A
at height bA has not yet been mined, then an error is thrown.
We assume any party interested in querying the oracle will be
incentivized to run Update(hB) for all new headers hB .
The initial state of contract Oracle is comprised of list
HeadersB = [h∗B ] where h
∗
B is the header for the genesis
block on chain B. The latest list of headers, HeadersA,
is native to blockchain A and is therefore assumed to be
accessible from within Oracle. Furthermore, let hX [g], hX [D],
and hX [P ] denote the target, difficulty, and hash of previous
block, respectively, specified in header hX for X ∈ {A,B}.
Finally, define HeadersX [−1] to be the last item added to list
HeadersX and letHX(hX) denote the hash of header hX .
Using difficulties DA and DB , extracted from the headers
on chains A and B, and spot hash price ratio σ∆, Oracle






where wA denotes the portion of allocation among chains A and






























A. Oracle for Common PoW Algorithms
When blockchains A and B use the same PoW algorithm,





. In this case,
all information required by Oracle is either provided to the
contract by way of the Update method or is accessible natively
on chain A.
Figure 5 and the MAE from Table I demonstrate that the
equilibrium agrees strongly with the actual allocation when
chains A and B use the same PoW algorithm. Thus, we can
verify price-ratio predictions would have been accurate within
less than 1% error.
B. Oracle for Different PoW Algorithms
Smart contract Oracle cannot be applied directly when
chains A and B implement different PoW algorithms because
spot hash prices do not cancel from Eq. 1. As a result, we must
use Eq. 3 to approximate relative security. In this section, we
show that it is possible to approximate the ratio of coin prices PBPA
with knowledge only of the ratio σ∆ = σAσB , which we presently
show how to calculate. To that end, we describe a new smart
contract, Spot, that serves to estimate the spot hash price ratio,
which can be used with Oracle when PoW algorithms differ
between chains.
Spot implements a variation of the scheme of Luu et al. [40].
Every epoch, a reward is offered for solving a mining puzzle
equivalent to PoW algorithm ALGB , only with a customized
target. Each epoch has multiple rounds, and the puzzle target
changes every round. Suppose that epoch i generated ri rounds,
and let gri denote the final target in epoch i, which was achieved
in round ri. In round 1 of epoch i+ 1, the target is set to αgri ,
where α > 0 is also a tunable parameter, and miners are invited
to solve the puzzle in return for rewardR, paid in units of coin
A. If after N blocks on chain A (N being similarly tunable)
no solution to the puzzle has been submitted, then the target is
raised by target step g∆ and round 2 commences. The step is
defined as g∆ = gri/j, where j > 0 is a tunable parameter. The
process continues until the final round when a valid solution is
submitted to the contract.
Given previous target gri and the final round count ri+1, along
with fixed parameters j, α, andN , we can estimate the spot price
ratio σA/σB for epoch i+ 1. Ozisik et al. [41] showed that the
expected number of hashes H performed in mining a block
(or solving a mining puzzle) with target g is given by H =
S/g, where S is the size of the hash space. It follows that, in
expectation, Hi+1 = S/(αgi+ri+1g∆) hashes were performed
during epoch i+1 in computing the hash inversion puzzle paying
rewardR. This implies that each hash using the PoW algorithm
of chain B is worthR(αgi + ri+1g∆)/S units of chain A coin.
Now suppose that, at the same time, the target on chain A is
gA. The reward per unit hash for mining a block on chain A is
given by kAgA/S, where kA is the number of coins awarded
for mining a block on chain A. An economically rational miner
capable of producing hashes from algorithm ALGB will therefore








There are 2 public methods on contract Spot: Solve(a,n)
and Query(f) and one private method Update(), which runs
automatically every time a block is produced on chain A (see
Algorithms 3, 4, and 5 in Appendix D). Contract state comprises
parameters j, α, N , and the following variables. RewardR = 0;
fee balance F = 0; round counter r = 1; round target gr =
S; round target change ∆g = S/j; and block counter bA =
length(HeadersA). The contract additionally stores prior
target g′ = S and target change ∆g′ = S/j. We assume that the
complete list of headers, HeadersA, is natively accessible. For
each header hA ∈ HeadersA, let hA[g] denote the target.
Method Solve(a,n) accepts payout address a and solution
nonce n. If the solution is valid, then Spot updates contract
state to reflect the target at which the puzzle was solved and
depositsR coins into account a. If the solution is not valid, then
no action is taken. Method Query(f) accepts only quantity f
of coin A as fee, and returns the latest calculation of spot ratio
according to Eq. 16. The funds comprisingR are derived from
fees paid by participants who use the service by calling Query.
For simplicity, we assumeR remains fixed, but it could be set
to a fixed fraction of the remaining fees collected.
Manipulation. Notice that, according to Eq. 16, the spot price
ratio ∆σ can be manipulated by a miner with exogenous
economic motivations who devotes more hash rate to solving
the puzzle than would ordinarily be profitable given the value of
coin A relative to coin B. This results in a solution after fewer
rounds than expected, which leads to an artificial increase in
the spot price of hashes for ALGA over ALGB . Yet, any hash
rate diverted to solving the puzzle will come at the expense of
mining blocks on chain B. Thus, the threat of manipulation can
be indirectly quantified. Moreover, it is much more difficult to
artificially decrease ∆σ because it would require all miners to
abstain from solving the puzzle even when it is more profitable
than mining chain B. Accordingly, a variation of Spot could
be implemented either on both chains A and B or both on chain
A alone with one reward denominated in coin A and the other in
coin B. The true value of ∆σ could be taken as the minimum of
the two reported values, making it more difficult to manipulate.
X. RELATED WORK
In the context of a single blockchain, Prat and Walter [42]
model the impacts of mining difficulty and coin exchange rate
on profitability. Ma et al. [43] show that there exists a Nash
equilibrium for the computing power allocated by miners given
a fixed mining difficulty. Kristoufek [44] derives an equilibrium
between miner hash rate production and PoW energy costs in
Bitcoin mining. Huberman et al. [45] devise an economic model
of the Bitcoin payment system that captures the tension between
users who compete for transaction processing capacity provided
by miners. Biais et al. [46] identify Markov-perfect equilibria
in miner consensus; their analysis is primarily theoretical with
only anecdotal supporting evidence.
Huang et al. [47] describe short-term investing and mining
strategies for cryptocurrencies relative to base currencies Lite-
coin and Bitcoin. Nguyen et al. [48] show that new cryptocur-
rencies have a small but significant negative impact on the price
of Bitcoin. Both stop short of identifying hash rate allocation
equilibria. Gandal et al. [49] analyzes price manipulation on
the Mt. Gox exchange, concluding that it was carried out by a
small group. Today there exist many exchanges, centralized and
decentralized, which makes such manipulation more difficult.
Meshkov et al. [50] analyze coin-hopping, where miners move
among blockchains using the same PoW according to which
is most profitable; see also [51]. Several works determine the
optimal hash rate allocation between blockchains for individual
miners or mining pools; e.g. [52–54].
Spiegelman et al. [4] apply the theory of Potential Games [55]
to the problem of miner hash rate allocation across multiple
blockchains. They prove that multiple stable equilibria can exist,
and that they can be achieved without the use of a sophisticated
utility function. However, they provide no means to explicitly
identify equilibria, nor is it clear from their work how a single
equilibrium is achieved among the multiple possibilities. Altman
et al. [56] reach similar conclusions using a different model of
hash rate allocation across cryptocurrencies and mining pools.
Kwon et al. [5] show that there exist multiple Nash equilibria
for miners who allocate their hash rate among two blockchains
sharing the same PoW. One of their equilibria coincides with
weq, the equilibrium we study, which they demonstrate is
observed in practice. However they fail to provide adequate
justification for its formation or uniqueness among other iden-
tified equilibria. The utility function used in their analysis is
quite complex and incorporates knowledge of the hash power of
miners, which is not publicly available.
Han et al. [57] investigate doublespending on blockchains
with relatively low hash rate instigated by either miners from a
higher hash rate chain or attackers who purchase hash rate from
a marketplace such as NiceHash [20]. Sapirshtein et al. [18] and
Gervais et al. [58] apply MDPs to blockchains to analyze selfish
mining [15] and double spend attacks.
There is much existing work in the finance literature related to
no arbitrage (NA) conditions and the law of one price (LOOP)
in the presence of short sale restrictions. Discrete-time models
include: LeRoy et al. [9], Chichilnisky [59], He et al. [60],
and Oleaga [61]. And continuous-time formulations include:
Napp [62], Pulido [63], Coculescu et al. [64], and Jarrow et
al. [65]. Continuous-time models are much richer than what is
necessary for our work, thus we use a discrete-time model in
this document. Kroeger and Sarkar [66] show that the LOOP
does not hold in the Bitcoin / fiat exchange market, indicating
frictions in some of these marketplaces. Yaish and Zohar [67]
use the NA principle to price ASIC mining hardware.
XI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a novel theory of the fiat value of security
allocated among PoW blockchains, which is supported with
empirical evidence and novel applications. Our principle finding
is that, for any pair of cryptocurrencies, not necessarily sharing
the same PoW algorithm, there exists a unique equilibrium
allocation, based on market prices only, that is robust even to
intentional manipulation of miner hash rate. We furthermore
establish a strong Granger-causal link from market price change
to change in security allocation, the opposite link is found to hold
only under exceptional circumstances. We end with a trustless
price ratio oracle that leverages the allocation equilibrium.
The generality of our framework opens new doors for future
work. In particular, our characterization of security in terms of
opportunity cost can generalize to other consensus principles,
such as PoS.
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[51] T. Király and L. Lomoschitz, “Profitability of the coin-hopping strategy,”
http://web.cs.elte.hu/egres/www/qp-18-03.html, March 2018.
[52] G. Bissias, B. Levine, and D. Thibodeau, “Using Economic Risk to Model
Miner Hash Rate Allocation in Cryptocurrencies,” in Proc. Cryptocurren-
cies and Blockchain Technology (CBT), 2018.
[53] L. W. Cong, Z. He, and J. Li, “Decentralized Mining in Centralized Pools,”
Review of Financial Studies, 2020.
[54] P. Chatzigiannis, F. Baldimtsi, I. Griva, and J. Li, “Diversification Across
Mining Pools: Optimal Mining Strategies under PoW,” in Workshop on
the Economics of Information Security (WEIS), 2019.
[55] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley, “Potential Games,” in Games and
Economic Behavior, vol. 14, no. 1, 1996, pp. 124–143.
[56] E. Altman, A. Reiffers, D. S. Menasche, M. Datar, S. Dhamal, and
C. Touati, “Mining competition in a multi-cryptocurrency ecosystem at
the network edge: A congestion game approach,” SIGMETRICS Perform.
Eval. Rev., vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 114–117, Jan. 2019.
[57] R. Han, Z. Sui, J. Yu, J. Liu, and S. Chen, “Sucker punch makes you richer:
Rethinking Proof-of-Work security model,” https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/
752, June 2019.
[58] A. Gervais, G. O. Karame, K. Wust, V. Glykantzis, H. Ritzdorf, and S. Cap-
kun, “On the Security and Performance of Proof of Work Blockchains,”
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/555, 2016.
[59] G. Chichilnisky, “Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the
existence of a competitive equilibrium with or without short sales,”
Economic Theory, vol. 5, no. 1, 1995.
[60] H. He and N. D. Pearson, “Consumption and portfolio policies with
incomplete markets and short-sale constraints: The infinite dimensional
case,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 259–304, 1991.
[61] G. E. Oleaga, “Arbitrage conditions with no short selling,” Boletı́n de
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURES
Symbol Description
A,B Either an arbitrary blockchain (chain) or its native coin
X Variable identifying a chain such that X ∈ {A,B}
ALGX The PoW algorithm for chain X
MX The set of miners capable of performing PoW WX
M The union of miners MA and MB
HX The number of WX hashes per second on chain X
TX Protocol targeted block inter-arrival time for chain X
tX Actual block inter-arrival time for chain X
τ Time since epoch
σX Fiat value of a single hash using WX
SX Target security investment on chain X
sX Actual security investment on chain X
w Security allocation vector among chains A and B
wi Security allocation for mi among chains A and B
ui Share of reward on chains A and B for miner mi
VX Fiat value of coinbase reward plus fees
kX Number of coins in coinbase reward plus average fees
PX Fiat value of a single coin from chain X
DX Difficulty, expected hashes required to mine a block
on chain X
R Relative reward for mining on chain A
N Total number of miners in the Security Allocation Game
mi,m−i Miner i and all other miners, respectively
π Expected fiat payoff
e, ei Initial fiat endowment in aggregate and for miner mi
c, ci Claim vector (of payoff) in aggregate and for mi
p Portfolio pricing vector
∆w Allocation vector rebalancing
Raw 1st differences
Time series Statistic p Statistic p
BTC/BCH actual −3.29 0.07 −36.0 < 0.01
BTC/BCH equilibrium −2.67 0.29 −27.8 < 0.01
ETH/ETC actual −2.25 0.47 −31.2 < 0.01
ETH/ETC equilibrium −2.34 0.44 −29.7 < 0.01
TABLE II: Check of preconditions. Augmented Dickey–Fuller
tests for unit-roots in the hourly time series used for Granger
causality. Series with p-values rejecting the null hypothesis fulfill
the conditions that make the asymptotic theory valid.
APPENDIX B
MARKOV DECISION PROCESS (MDP) DETAILS
At a high level, our MDP is comprised of states corresponding
to the current difficulty on each chain, actions correspond to the
allocation of available hash rate between the two chains, and
transitions occur every second. Details are given below.
States. Each state is a tuple of the form (DA, DB , βA, βB),
where DA and DB are the difficulties on chains A and B,
respectively, given in terms of the expected number of hashes
per block. Each chain is additionally given a single bit βA or βB ,
which indicates that a bock is mined on the given chain when
the bit is flipped from one state to the next.
Actions. Each action a corresponds to the amount of hash rate
allocated to chain A for the next second. The remaining hash
rate b is allocated to chain B so that a+ b = 6, i.e. the total hash
rate is equal to 6 hashes per second.
Transitions. A transition corresponds to an update in difficulty
and block mining status, it occurs any time one of those values
change on either blockchain. The only valid change in difficulty
is to move from DX to D′X = 2x, for X ∈ {A,B}, which
indicates that when a block is mined the difficulty updates to
twice the hash rate applied to the chain (to enforce 2 second
block times). For X ∈ {A,B}, let P [DX , x] be the probability
that a block is mined on chain X after 1 second, for the
given difficulty and hash rate. Similarly, define C[DX , x] to
be the quantity of blocks mined on chain X during a 1 second
interval, given that at least one block will be mined. We have
the following transition probabilities and rewards where success
on a given chain is defined as the event of mining at least one
block.
• Both success: (DA, DB , βA, βB)→ (D′A, D′B , 1− βA, 1−
βB)
Probability: P [DA, a]P [DB , b]
Reward: 2C[DA, a] + C[DB , b]
• A success: (DA, DB , βA, βB)→ (D′A, D′B , 1− βA, βB)
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Fig. 9: Evolution of the ETH/ETC prediction error over time.
Monthly distributions of hourly differences between equilibrium
and actual hash rate allocation (in allocation units). Positive
values mean that for the observed market prices, our theory
predicts a higher allocation of hash power to ETH than estimated
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Fig. 10: Shift of prediction error within Bitcoin’s SAA epoch.
Distribution of hourly differences between equilibrium and actual
hash rate allocation (in allocation units). Top: actual allocation
estimated from the nominal difficulty for BTC and BCH. Bottom:
actual allocation estimated from a 96-hour moving window for
BTC and nominal difficulty for BCH.
• B success: (DA, DB , βA, βB)→ (D′A, D′B , βA, 1− βB)
Probability: (1− P [DA, a])P [DB , b]
Reward: C[DB , b]
• None success: (DA, DB , βA, βB)→ (D′A, D′B , βA, βB)
Probability: (1− P [DA, a])(1− P [DB , b])
Reward: 0
For PoW functions where the best known solving algorithm is
trial and error, and negligible network latency, the block inter-
arrival time is exponentially distributed. Specifically, Ozisik
et al. [41] showed that inter-arrival time Ti for block i has
distribution T ∼ Expon(TDi/x), where T is the target block
time, Di is the difficulty (expected number of hashes per block),
and x is the actual number of hashes performed every T seconds.
ForX ∈ {A,B}, the success probability on chainX is therefore
given by




where f(t) is the PDF of the distribution Expon(DX/x). That
is to say, P [DX , x] it is given by the cumulative distribution
for the exponential from time 0 until 1 second. To derive the
expression for block quantity (in excess of 1 block during a 1
second interval) we must first contemplate the time that the first
block is mined, t, and then the number of additional blocks that
will be mined in the 1 − t remaining seconds. The former is
governed by an exponential distribution, while the latter follows
a Poisson distribution. We have










where again f(t) is the PDF of the distribution Expon(DX/x)
and f ′(t) is the distribution Poisson(t). This expression first
adds a reward for the first block mined. Next, for each time
t ∈ [0, 1], it calculates the expected quantity of blocks from 0
to 10 total (stopping at 10 because larger values are unlikely),
weighted by the probability of mining the first block in time t.
Finally, to condition on the event that a first block is found, the
expected block count beyond 1 is normalized by the probability
of mining a block in the first second. Notice that we use unit
difficulty for all blocks other than the first since the DAA is
assumed to be adjust perfectly at that point.
APPENDIX C
FUTURES LEVERAGING ORACLE
EXAMPLE 1: Suppose that we wish to introduce fully
decentralized futures contracts to blockchain A intended to be
negotiated between two parties: guarantor G and beneficiary
B. To do so, a smart contract can be developed that leverages
Oracle. Each futures contract, or future transfers from guar-
antor to beneficiary a quantity of coins A equivalent to the
value of a quantity of coin B at a future date. Specifically, a
future issued at the time when chains A and B are at block
heights bA and bB , allows the beneficiary to trade the contract
to the guarantor for a quantity of coins A equivalent to 1 coin
B on the expiry date. We define expiry as the latter of block
heights b′A and b
′
B , anticipated to be some time in the future (for
example 90 days). Contract Future implements four methods:
Deposit(a), Recover(a), Issue(bA, bB , b′A, b
′
B , a), and
Redeem(b′A, b
′
B). Deposit is signed by G; it deposits quantity
a of coin A into Future. This will be used to pay B at expiry.
Prior to calling Issue, the funds can be redeemed by G if
he signs Recover. The call to Issue must be signed by
both G and B; signifying that they agree to the initial and
expiry block times and fee of a coins, which is paid by B
and immediately transferred to an account owned by G. Once
headers h′A and h
′




B have been generated,
B first calls Update(h′B) on Oracle and then signs Redeem.
In response to this method, contract Future deposits into an
account controlled by B a quantity of A coins that are equivalent







1 if hB [P ] 6= H(h′B) then
2 return;
3 end





Algorithm 2: Oracle.Query(bA, bB , σ∆)
1 if length(HeadersA) < bA then
2 throw error;
3 end
4 if length(HeadersB) < bB then
5 throw error;
6 end





1 P = H(HeadersA[−1]);
2 ifH(P,n, a) < g then
3 bA = length(HeadersA);
4 (r, g′, g′∆) = (1, g, g∆);
5 g∆ = g/j;
6 g = αg;




THEOREM 1: The following allocation is a symmetric












where n = N − 1 and c = TBRTBR−TAR+TA . When TA = TB the
equilibrium simplifies to c = R.
PROOF: Allocation [w∗i ,w∗−i] constitutes a Nash equilibrium
if every miner’s best response at that point is to maintain the
same allocation. Because miner resources are assumed to be
homogenous, it will suffice to show that wiA = cN is the best
response when w∗−iA =
cn
N .
When the allocation for miners m−i is w−iA, the best response
for miner mi is given by πTwi, which we denote in this proof
simply by yi. Thus, our task is to show that w∗iA =
c
N is the
global optimum of yi when w−iA = cnN . To that end, we
proceed by identifying and testing the critical points of function
yi, beginning with its local optima.






































The quantity on the left is always positive and because
w−iA < nN and wiA + w−iA < 1, the absolute value of the
quantity on the right is also positive. Therefore, only the positive
Algorithm 4: Spot.Query(f)
1 F += f ;
2 return kAgAR(αg′+rg′∆) ;
Algorithm 5: Spot.Update()
1 if length(HeadersA) > bA +N then
2 bA = length(HeadersA);
3 r += 1;
4 g += g∆;
5 end






( nN − w−iA)VBTA√
w−iAVATB +
√
( nN − w−iA)VBTA
(17)
is the only local optimum. Thus, we proceed by performing the
substitution w∗−iA =
cn
N in Eq. 17 and showing that its value is







and c = TBVATBVA+TAVB , we






















































Next, we turn our attention to proving that [w∗i ,w
∗
−i] is actually
a global optimum by showing its payoff, yic, exceeds that of
other critical points of the payoff function. Endpoints
[(0, cN ), (
cn
N , 0)] and [(
c
N , 0), (
cn
N , 0)] constitute the remaining












It can be shown that yic ≥ yi0 and yic ≥ yi 1N for all choices of
VA
TA
and VBTB . Therefore, allocation wiA =
c
N maximizes payoff




−i] is a Nash equilibrium.
2
PROPOSITION 1: For any fixed allocation w, after the SAAs
on chains A and B come to rest, the portfolio pricing vector will
be p = ew.
PROOF: Consider a blockchain X with aggregate claim cX(τ)
and prevailing price pX(τ) = SX(τ). Together these two
quantities entirely determine the actual security investment
applied to the chain:
sX(τ) = cX(τ)pX(τ) = cX(τ)SX(τ). (18)
Thus in order for the SAA to be at rest, it must be the case that
cX(τ) = 1. The same reasoning can be applied to any
blockchain, so that if both SAAs are at rest at time τ , then c(τ)
18
is a vector of all ones. Finally, from Eq. 6 we have that
p(τ) = ew(τ) c(τ) = ew(τ).
2
THEOREM 2: Assume any choice of SAA for chains A and B
(not necessarily the same). When the relative reward R is stable,











weq = (R, 1−R),
if TA = TB .
PROOF: Suppose that the current allocation is weq and both
SAAs are at rest. From Proposition 1, we know that the price of





Now consider the payoff and price associated with the change





for arbitrary δ1, δ2 > 0. That is to say, the allocation to chain A
is boosted proportional to δ1 while the allocation to chain B is
sold short proportional to δ2. According to Eq. 6, in the
moments before either SAA responds to this allocation change,




























To prove the theorem, it will suffice to show that (i) when
∆cTπ > 0, ∆cTp ≥ 0 and (ii) when ∆cTp < 0, ∆cTπ ≤ 0.
To that end, note that in order for ∆cTπ > 0, it must be the
case that δ1 > δ2. Therefore, ∆cTp > 0. Conversely, if
∆cTp < 0, then δ2 > δ1, which implies that ∆cTπ < 0.
2
LEMMA 1: For initial allocation w and price p, the claims
associated with a symmetric rebalancing∆w are given by∆c =
∆w w and it is always the case that ∆cTp = 0.
PROOF: According to Eq. 6, prior to either SAA responding to
the allocation rebalancing, the claim associated with ∆w is
given by ∆c = e∆w  p. (19)
Meanwhile, Proposition 1 establishes that p = ew. Thus, it
follows that ∆c = ∆w w. Returning to Eq. 19, it is also
apparent that ∆cTp = e(∆wA +∆wB), which is always zero
provided that ∆w is symmetric.
2
THEOREM 3: For any allocation w 6= weq, there exists a
symmetric allocation rebalancing ∆w, such that |(w +∆w)−
weq| ≤ |w −weq|, which has price zero and strictly positive
payoff.
PROOF: Without loss of generality we may assume that
wA < weqA, which implies that w = weq − (δ1,−δ2) for δ1
and δ2 such that 0 < δ1, δ2 < 1. Let ∆w = (ε,−ε) for some
ε < min{δ1, δ2}. Note that, by construction,
|(w +∆w)−weq| ≤ |w −weq|. According to Lemma 1, we
have
∆c = ∆w  (weq − (δ1, δ2)).




(1− δ1)TBVA − δ1TAVB
,
−ε(TBVA + TAVB)
(1 + δ2)TAVB + δ2TBVA
)
.









where α = ε(TBVA + TAVB). Notice that
(1− δ1)TBVA − δ1TAVB = weqA − δ1 > 0. Therefore, both
terms in the difference above are positive. It follows that payoff
∆cTp will be greater than zero provided that
−δ1T 2AV 2B − δ2T 2BV 2A < (δ1 + δ2)TATBVAVB ,
which is true for all valid δ1 and δ2.
Next, consider the price of rebalancing: ∆cTp. Since
∆c = e∆w  p, it follows that
∆cTp = e(∆wA +∆wB) = e(ε− ε) = 0,
which implies that the price associated with rebalancing is zero.
2
COROLLARY 1: For allocation w 6= weq, any symmetric
rebalancing allocation ∆w such that |(w + ∆w) − weq| >
|w −weq| has price zero will result in strictly negative payoff.
PROOF: Again, without loss of generality, we may assume
that wA < weqA and thatw = weq − (δ1,−δ2). To ensure that
|(w +∆w)−weq| > |w −weq|, it must be the case that
∆w = (−ε, ε) for some ε > 0. Since ∆w is symmetric,
Lemma 1 ensures that it achieves a portfolio price of zero.










which can never be positive. 2
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